In the proxy war launched by the ISI in the State in 1989, the operating principle was "hit and run", the aim being to create demoralisation in the Indian security forces and the civilian population by inflicting large casualties on them. "Liberation" and occupation of territory was not the immediate objective. The ISI had calculated that if it kept the Indian security forces bleeding, political and public opinion in India would ultimately realise the futility of holding on to the State.

The proxy invasion plan of Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Pervez Musharraf, changed the operating principle to one of "occupy and hit", the aim being to set up a bridgehead by occupying the ridges in the Kargil sector left unguarded by the Indian army during winter and thereafter spread the area under occupation each winter by taking advantage of its logistic difficulties. The role of the Pakistan army became primary in this operation and that of the ISI and the militant-cum-terrorist groups secondary.

The proxy invasion plan having failed partly due to the vigorous operations of the Indian army and Air Force and partly due to international pressure on Pakistan, Islamabad has now reverted back to the earlier operating principle of "hit and run", with the primary role once again being assumed by the ISI and its surrogates in the State. The ISI's proxy war has passed through two stages. During the first stage (1989-92), the ISI played a direct role in providing financial, training and arms assistance to militant groups in the State. No intermediaries were used and assistance was given to any group, which was prepared to indulge in violence.

A large number of Kashmiri militant groups received ISI assistance during this period--some led by the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) of the Jamaat-e-Islami which advocated merger of the State with Pakistan and others by the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which wanted independence. Within a few months of the start of the proxy war, the pro-independence groups set up their ascendancy over the pro-Pakistan groups. Till 1992, the US and other Western countries looked upon the extremists as "freedom-fighters" and not terrorists and showed no interest in the demand for independence. However, the situation changed after the extremists' attack on a group of Israeli tourists in 1992.

For the first time, there was concern in the West over the terrorist methods of these groups and over the role of the ISI in assisting them. There was also increasing interest in non-governmental circles in the US close to the Clinton Administration in the aims and objectives of the pro-independence groups. The feasibility of independence as a solution became the subject of study by many of these non-governmental groups. Concerned over these developments, the ISI introduced two changes in 1993. First, it started using intermediaries for keeping the militancy alive instead of directly doing so. Second, it cut off assistance to all pro-independence groups and made future assistance dependent on the recipient group supporting merger with Pakistan. The first organisation chosen as the intermediary was the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed. Funds and arms and ammunition were given to it and it was asked to take over the responsibility for running training camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Afghanistan with the help of Afghan veterans and for distributing money and weapons to different pro-Pakistan groups. Most of the assistance went to the HM.

In 1993, the Taliban had not yet appeared on the scene in Afghanistan and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar was still the most important and favored Pakhtoon Mujahideen group in Afghanistan. The recruits of the HM were trained in camps in Afghan territory by instructors of Hizb-e-Islami and the Afghan mercenaries who came into Kashmir with the HM were followers of Heckmatyar. Subsequently, the ISI started using the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad and its militant wing called the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) too as intermediaries for funneling assistance to the extremists in the State. These organisations, of Wahabi orientation, are closer to the Jamiat-ul-Islam of Pakistan headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman and to the Taliban.

The ISI saw in the anger in the Indian Muslim community caused by the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December,1992, an opportunity to drive a wedge between the Hindus and Muslims in the rest of India, thereby adding to the difficulties of the Government of India. It also wanted the extremist groups supported by it in Kashmir to attack the Hindus of the Jammu Division in order to drive them out. Thus, from 1993, the ISI's assistance to the extremist groups in the State was made conditional on their supporting merger with Pakistan, agreeing to attack the Hindus in the Jammu Division and assisting the alienated sections of the Muslim youth in the rest of India in developing a militant capability by training them in their camps in Kashmiri territory.

The Jammat-e-Islami and the HM were reluctant to accept these conditions as they did not want to extend their operational aims beyond Kashmir, but the Lashkar, the HuA and the Al Badr, which subsequently came into the picture, readily accepted them. They thus became the privileged groups of the ISI from 1994 onwards and have now been orchestrating most of the violence in the State. Though the HM, the Lashkar, the HuA and the Al Badr still claim to be working together, important differences divide them:

***The HM is essentially an organisation of indigenous Kashmiris, but the other three consist largely of Pakistanis, Afghans and Arab mercenaries.

***The HM describes its aim as the liberation of Kashmir from the control of the Government of India and its merger with Pakistan. The other three describe their aim as the liberation of Kashmir from the control of the Hindus and its merger with Pakistan, to be followed by a similar "liberation" of the Muslims in the rest of India. These three organisations view Kashmir as the "gateway to India" and call for the creation of two more Muslim homelands--one for the Muslims of North India and the other for those of South India.

***In pursuance of their aims, the Lashkar and the HuA have been spreading their presence to the rest of India and networking with Islamic extremist groups in other States.

***The HM is close to Heckmatyar whereas the other three are supporters of the Taliban. Angered by the proximity of the HM to Heckmatyar, the Taliban has closed down its training camps in Afghanistan and expelled its office-bearers from there. ***The Lashkar, the HuA and the Al Badr are strongly against the US, Israel and the ruling family of Saudi Arabia and are members of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and Israel, but the HM keeps away from the anti-US and anti-Saudi ruling family activities of bin Laden.

In its eagerness to achieve its objectives against India, Pakistan, through the ISI, has thus been following contradictory policies. It seeks US support for the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, but has been arming groups, which vow to attack American targets, in order to use them against India. It describes Saudi Arabia as its closest Islamic ally, but has been sheltering groups which are carrying on a campaign against the Saudi ruling family and the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia.

The increasing concern in the US intelligence community over the use of these anti-US and anti-Israel groups by Pakistan in its attempts to destabilise India is an important reason for the sympathetic attitude of the US towards India during the conflict in the Kargil sector.

The US declared the HuA as an international terrorist organisation in October,1997, after which it has re-named itself as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and there have been reports that the US is collecting evidence against the Lashkar in order to make a similar declaration against it.

Despite this, the ISI, with the approval of the Sharif Government, continues to use these organisations to massacre Hindus in the Jammu Division and to organise acts of violence in the Valley too. An intensification of such terrorist violence not only in Jammu & Kashmir, but also in other parts of India is to be expected in the wake of the set-back suffered by the Pakistan army in the Kargil area. Another danger is the possibility of attacks on American targets in India by these organisations to give vent to their anger against the US and to create embarrassment to the Government of India in its relations with the US.

WHEREABOUTS OF BIN LADEN: An Analysis One of the priority tasks of the reshuffled ISI is going to be to pressurise the Taliban to throw Bin Laden out of Afghanistan. Nawaz Sharif is under tremendous pressure from the US to make the Taliban moderate its anti-woman policies and to hand over Bin Laden to the US, failing which the US reportedly wants the ISI and the IB to co-operate with the CIA and the FBI in having him captured from his hide-out in Kandahar and flown to the US in a Noriega-style operation. Nawaz is apparently in a dilemma. Bin Laden is a hero figure to large sections of Pashtoons, not only of Afghanistan, but also of Pakistan. Any suspicion that he colluded with the US in the capture of Bin Laden could turn the Pashtoon public opinion in general and the Islamic extremists in particular against him. At the same time, failure to act on the repeated US requests could delay the lifting of the US sanctions against Pakistan even if he gives satisfaction to the US on the non- proliferation issue. Pakistani authorities, therefore, seem to be trying to explore the possibility of helping Bin Laden to escape to the Southern Philippines where the Abu Sayaaf group might give him shelter in the territory under its control or to Chechnya. No Government of any Islamic State would accept him lest they fall foul of the US. The only way out, in Pakistani calculation, is to help him to flee to a country where Muslim insurgent elements control some territory.

Assessment in our paper of December 18,1998, titled "Revamp Of Pakistani Intelligence".

For nearly a year now, the US authorities have been pressing Pakistan to help them in mounting a Noriega-style operation to have Bin Laden whisked out of his hide-out in Kandahar and flown to the US for interrogation and prosecution. After the bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August last year, large sections of the Pakistani press were feverishly speculating about the imminence of a helicopter-borne US raid into Kandahar to capture Bin Laden and take him away. Instead, the US retaliation came in the form of Cruise missile attacks on some of the training camps of Bin Laden's organisation and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in Afghan territory. The attacks were not as successful as hoped for by US officials. On the night of the Cruise missile attacks, Gen. Joseph Ralston, Vice-Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has reportedly been closely involved in the planning of the operation to capture Bin Laden, paid a lightning visit to Islamabad and dined with Gen.Jehangir Karamat, the then Chief of the Army Staff. It was given out by the Pakistani and the US authorities that Pakistan had no prior intimation of the Cruise missile attacks and that Ralston's visit was to tell the Pakistani authorities that the missiles had been fired by the US Navy, to avoid any panic in Pakistan under the mistaken impression that they had been fired by India. However, critics of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan had been alleging that Pakistan was privy to the bombings much before the Cruise missiles were launched and that the real purpose of Ralston's presence in Pakistan was to ensure that there was no last-minute co-ordination problem.(US Bombing in Afghanistan)

The Taliban authorities, who had initially imposed movement and communications restrictions on Bin Laden after the missile attacks, subsequently removed them, thereby enabling him to again contact the international press, directly through the satellite telephone as well as indirectly through Peshawar-based Pakistani journalists, and utter threats against the US. These threats became more hysterical after the US-UK bombings of Iraq in December.(Osama Bin Laden-update) Despite Nawaz's revamping of the ISI and the Intelligence Bureau, his hand-picked chiefs of these organisations were unable to prevent Bin Laden from using the Peshawar-based journalists to utter threats against the US and to persuade the Taliban Amir, Mullah Omar, to expel Bin Laden from Afghanistan. Pakistan's demand for expelling Bin Laden was supported by a section of the Taliban leaders based in Kabul, but Mullah Omar remained defiant in his refusal to do so.(Rumblings in Afghanistan)

It was in this context that the "Guardian" of the UK, quoting US intelligence and anti-Saddam Hussain political exile sources, reported in the first week of February that Farouk Hijazi, Iraq's Ambassador to Turkey, who, according to the "Guardian", belongs to the Iraqi intelligence, had visited Kandahar in the last week of December,1998, and conveyed to Bin Laden an offer of shelter in Iraq in return for the assistance of his organisation in Iraq's campaign against the US and Saudi Arabia.

Since then, similar reports of the likelihood of Bin Laden shifting his headquarters to Iraq had been circulating, most of them apparently originating from the US intelligence community. During the visit to Pakistan in the first week of February by Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State, his delegation included not only Gen. Ralston, but also reportedly senior CIA and FBI officers handling the Bin Laden operation. While Ralston accompanied Talbott on his visit to New Delhi too, which preceded his visit to Islamabad, the intelligence officers were believed to have directly flown to Islamabad and joined the Talbott delegation there.

While it was given out by the US officials that the purpose of the inclusion of Ralston was to discuss the possibility of the resumption of the normal interactions of the US armed forces with their Indian and Pakistani counterparts, it is believed that another purpose was to again press the Pakistani authorities to give clearance for a joint operation to capture Bin Laden. In addition to the non-proliferation question, the Bin Laden issue also figured prominently in the discussions of Talbott , his No.2, Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State, and Ralston in Islamabad.

On February 1, Maulvi Jalil Akhund, the Taliban's Deputy Foreign Minister, was flown to Islamabad from Kandahar in a special plane. He met Nawaz Sharif, Sartaj Aziz, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, and then Inderfurth, reportedly at Aziz's residence. Nawaz had also presided over a high-level meeting attended, amongst others, by Gen. Pervez Musharaf, the chief of the army staff, and Lt. Gen.Ziauddin, the new Director-General of the ISI, to discuss about Bin Laden

During the stay of the Talbott delegation, Inderfurth also visited Peshawar and reportedly sought the understanding and co-operation of the moderate, anti-Taliban Pashtoon leaders in the USA's efforts to bring Bin Laden to justice.

It was reported that the US officials made clear to their Pakistani and Afghan interlocutors the USA's determination to capture Bin Laden and bring him to justice with their co-operation, if possible, and without it, if left with no other option.

Initially, Maulvi Akhund and other Taliban leaders remained as defiant as ever in their refusal to hand over Bin Laden either to the US or to Saudi Arabia, but as fresh speculation flared up in Pakistan about the likelihood of a new US attack on Afghanistan, including a possible raid on Kandahar itself to capture Bin Laden, the Taliban authorities re-imposed the movement and communications restrictions on Bin Laden.

Subsequently, they announced that while they would not betray Bin Laden and expel or extradite him, if he wanted to leave Afghanistan on his own, they would allow him to leave. Since February 13, Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders have been claiming that Bin Laden has disappeared from Afghanistan.

Mohammed Tayyab, a Taliban spokesman, told journalists at Kandahar on February 13: "He has disappeared. We didn't ask him to leave. We don't know where he is." Presuming that the Taliban's claim that Bin Laden is no longer in Afghanistan is correct, there are five places where he could have found fresh shelter: the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, Southern Philippines, Chechnya, Yemen and Iraq. The Pakistan Government's control over the FATA is very weak and the inhabitants of this area are quite loyal to him. However, the US might find it much easier to mount an operation in FATA than in Kandahar.

While admitting past contacts with and financial assistance from Bin Laden, the Islamic extremists of Southern Philippines have recently denied any present links with him, thereby distancing themselves from reports of a likelihood of his fleeing to Southern Philippines His ability to get across to Chechnya undetected and unintercepted by the US and Russia is poor. He is of Yemeni origin with many relatives and supporters in Yemen, but the attitude of the local Government to him would be uncertain. This leaves, for the present, only Iraq where he might be welcomed and helped in order to use him and his set-up in Iraq's stepped- up campaign against Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the US. If it turns out to be correct that he has fled to Iraq, he could not have gone there, or for that matter, anywhere else, without the connivance of the Pakistani authorities. In 1996, the Pakistani authorities had allowed him to go to Jalalabad from Sudan through Peshawar. Without felicitation by the ISI, it would have been almost impossible for him to fly out. There has been some speculation of his having crossed over to Iran. This is doubtful because of his close association with the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba of Pakistan which has been responsible for the deaths of many Iranian officials in Paki OSAMA BIN LADEN: An Update B.Raman The New Delhi Police announced on January 19,1999 the arrest of Syed Abu Nasir, a Bangladeshi national, who is allegedly a member of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (the Army of the Pure), the armed wing of the Pakistan-based Markaz Dawa Al Irshad (Centre For Preaching), and recovery from him of two kgs of RDX explosive and some detonators. He was reported to have told the Police that he had entered India from Pakistan via Bangladesh in October,1998, along with 6 others-4 from Egypt and one each from the Sudan and Myanmar-to organise explosions outside the US Consulates in Calcutta and Chennai around January 26,1999.He gave the names of the Egyptian nationals as Mustafa, Ibrahim al Hazaraa, Ismail and Zainul Abideen, of the Sudanese as Lui and the Myanmarese national as Hafeez Mohammad Saleh. According to the Police, Abu Nasir (apparently an assumed name) said that all of them first reached Calcutta from Bangladesh and then proceeded to Chennai. Abu Nasir alone thereafter came to New Delhi leaving behind the others in Chennai. The Police are searching for them and, at the time of the recording of this update, there is no news of their arrest. Press reports of the Police version have also alleged that the suspects "are believed to be close associates of Osama Bin Laden" and that they had " active assistance and guidance from the ISI to blow up the US consulates." The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is the military-controlled Pakistani external intelligence agency. The Washington correspondent of "The Hindu" of Chennai (January 22), quoting a US State Department spokesman, has reported that US security experts are already in India for discussions with their New Delhi counterparts and for gathering more facts. Media reports indicate that while US security experts are taking the development seriously, they are at the same time skeptical of insinuations of ISI involvement. The Pakistan Government has also strongly repudiated the insinuations. It would have been better for the New Delhi police to collect more facts and verify them instead of rushing to the media with their conjectures and theories which, if proved wrong by subsequent investigation, could add to the doubts in the minds of international security experts about our professionalism and credibility. Claims of ISI involvement do not stand to reason unless it is the involvement of some rogue elements in the ISI without the knowledge of their superior officers and the political leadership. All indications from Pakistan are that the Pakistani political leadership as well as senior levels of the Pakistani security bureaucracy are themselves seriously embarrassed by and concerned over the activities of Bin Laden and would be happy to be rid of him. At a time when Pakistan is badly dependent on the US support for a rescue package from the IMF to prevent an economic collapse and trying to persuade the US to resume its past military supply relationship with Pakistan, it would be foolhardy for its political leadership or security bureaucracy or both to get involved in any projects directed against US lives and property. All indications from Pakistan are that the Nawaz Sharif Government, while overtly maintaining that the Bin Laden affair is a matter between the US and the Taliban of Afghanistan in which Pakistan has no role to play, is covertly co-operating with US security experts in their efforts to have Bin Laden smoked out of Afghanistan. What is significant about the development is the indication of the suspects belonging to the Lashkar of the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad. The Markaz and its Lashkar have had a close relationship with Bin Laden for over a decade and have been supporting his campaign against the Saudi ruling family for allowing Western, particularly US, troops into Saudi Arabia, thereby allegedly desecrating the Muslim holy land. In the past, Bin Laden had financially helped the Markaz and the Lashkar and financed the construction of a mosque and a guest house inside the complex of the Markaz at Muridke in Pakistani Punjab. Of the various Islamic organisations of Pakistan, the Markaz, its Lashkar, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar), and the Sipah-e-Sahaba have become members of Bin Laden's International Islamic Front For Jihad Against the US and Israel, formed in May,1998. The Sipah-e-Sahaba is a purely Pakistani Sunni organisation with no foreign cadres. Its activities are confined to Pakistan and Afghanistan and mainly directed against the Shias. While being verbally critical of the US and supportive of Bin Laden, it has not so far indulged in any ground activity against the US. The Markaz, its Lashkar and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen have an international cadre of Jihadists with experience of ground operations in Afghanistan, Tadjikistan, Xinjiang, Chechnya,Bosnia, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and the Southern Philippines. Possibly in Thailand too, but one is not certain. In India itself, the presence and experience of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen have till now been confined to Kashmir and possibly Himachal Pradesh. Indications till now are that of all the Pakistani organisations forming part of Bin Laden's Islamic Front Against the US and Israel, only the Markaz and its Lashkar have cadres and experience of terrorist operations in other parts of India too. Before May 1998, the Markaz and its Lashkar had designated India and Israel as the principal enemies of Islam, but after the US bombings of Afghanistan in August,1998, they have included the US also in their enemies' list and have been calling for a jihad against the US too in which they have called upon the Muslim citizens of the US too to join. Addressing the annual congregations of the two organisations at Muridke ( November 4 to 6,1998), Prof. Mohammed Saeed, their Amir, said that all evil in the world emanated from the White House which would be blown up by the Muslims. He expressed the determination of his organisations to have the flag of Islam planted in New Delhi, Tel Aviv and Washington. Thus, if the Markaz and its Lashkar want to plan an operation against US interests, either on their own or at the instance of Bin Laden, India could very well be their first choice as suitable terrain. Worrying from the point of view of counter-terrorism experts of not only the US , but also other countries should be recent indications that the Taliban, which had imposed certain restrictions on the movements and activities of Bin Laden after the US bombings, has since lifted them. He has again been allowed to travel to other parts of Afghanistan, give interviews to foreign journalists uttering threats against the US, acquire agricultural land for fruit cultivation and start business ventures for the export of olives and other fruits grown in his orchards in the Jalalabad area of Afghanistan. Thus, the Taliban seems to be determined to defy pressure from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to at least control his activities and from the US to hand him over to the US authorities for trial. In January every year, the Counter-Terrorism Division of the US State Department prepares and submits to the President its report on the patterns of global terrorism in the previous year, with its recommendations regarding any revisions in the list of State-sponsors of international terrorism. The report with the President's decision is then placed before the Congress, generally when it re-assembles after Easter. An important thrust of this year's report is likely to be the activities of Bin Laden from Afghanistan and the Taliban's support to him. Important questions for presidential decision would be: Should the US declare Afghanistan, whose Taliban Government it does not recognise, as a State-sponsor of international terrorism or should it confine itself to declaring the Taliban as a terrorist organisation without any action against the State of Afghanistan? Should the US, in addition, declare the Markaz and its Lashkar too as terrorist organisations? With the recently reported withdrawal of UNOCAL, the US oil company, from the consortium for the construction of an oil and gas pipeline network from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, a clear-cut US decision on the subject would have been hopefully made easier.